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Abstract 
Endogenous growth theory suggests that human capital formation plays a significant role for 
the ‘wealth and poverty of nations.’ In contrast to previous studies which denied the role of 
human capital as a crucial determinant of for really long-term growth, we confirm its 
importance. Indicators of human capital like literacy rates are lacking for the period of 1450-
1913; hence, we use per capita book production as a proxy for advanced literacy skills. This 
study explains how, and to what extent, growth disparities are a function of human capital 
formation.  
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1. Introduction  
There is considerable debate about the causes of welfare growth before the Industrial 
Revolution, and particularly about the role of human capital formation in that process 
(Acemoglu et al. 2001, Cervellati and Sunde 2005, Galor and Weil 2000). One approach has 
focused on the demographic regime – i.e. a trade-off between the quantity and quality of 
children –, arguing that the Industrial Revolution must have been preceded by a switch towards 
a regime characterized by high human capital formation (Becker, Tamura and Murphy, 1990; 
Lucas, 2002). However, economic historians have not found evidence for such a demographic 
regime change in the centuries before 1800. Usually, the ‘demographic transition’ which 
inspired these theories is dated in the period after 1870, about one century after the onset of the 
Industrial Revolution in Great Britain (Mokyr 1990, Clark 2003; but see De Moor and Van 
Zanden 2005 for an alternative interpretation). In reaction to this, Galor and Weil (2002), Galor 
and Moav (2002), and Galor (2005) have modeled the initial growth spurt as driven by the 
positive effects of population growth and population density only, with demographically 
induced human capital formation having played a major role not before the second Industrial 
Revolution of the late 19
th century. But also the evidence for a rise of human capital formation 
in the centuries before 1800 is disputed by economic historians, pointing out, for example, that 
levels of literacy stagnated during the Industrial Revolution (Mokyr 2002, Allen 2003). Their 
assessment that human capital formation did not play a key role in causing industrialization 
clearly contradicts the expectations of growth economists. 
  These studies suffer from the problem that human capital formation is difficult to 
quantify, in particular for the pre modern period. We propose that book production is better 
suited to measure a number of aspects of human capital formation than traditional measures 
such as literacy, i.e. the ability to sign a contract or register. This study is the first to present a 
time variant proxy for human capital as far back as the late Middle Ages. Moreover, little was 
previously known about the human capital of countries such as India, China, Indonesia, and   4
Japan, for which we present cross-sectional evidence in the last section of this paper. Welfare 
growth is defined as the growth of real wages, since they can be measured more or less 
accurately for the 15th through the 19th century for a number of countries (Allen 2001, 2003). 
For the period of 1820-1913, relatively reliable GDP estimates are available.  
Our primary hypothesis is that 
(1) human capital formation, as measured by our indicator of book production, can explain 
differences in economic growth over the period under study. 
Furthermore, we test two alternative (or complementary) hypotheses: 
(2) Welfare growth was stimulated by intercontinental trade, which provided competitive 
advantages (Allen 2003). 
(3) Growth-enhancing institutions such as those hindering the executive from expropriating 
capital stimulated early modern welfare growth, perhaps in coevolution with Atlantic trade 
(Acemoglu et al. 2002). 
This paper is structured as follows: the newly created data set and its sources are 
presented first, including comments on its strengths and limitations. In a series of regression 
analyses, we then estimate the influence of human capital on welfare growth while controlling 
for a number of other variables, and take a closer look at the conditional convergence 
phenomenon. Finally, we address potential endogeneity issues and test the relationship with a 
hold-out sample. 
 
2. Data  
Our estimates of the output of printed books are based on the number of titles or editions which 
appeared in Western Europe between 1454 and 1800. For the details about the data set, there is 
a longer working paper version (Baten and van Zanden 2006), where we also discuss the 
questions on book imports and exports, production and consumption. Our individual 
observation units, “titles “ include both first editions and re-editions, the latter being   5
publications distinguished from previous editions by changes made in the contents (revised 
edition) or layout (new edition). To illustrate this, the first printing of Gutenberg’s bible is 
considered an individual title, as is any new edition of that bible, whereas a reprint of exactly 
the same manuscript would not count as a title as such. The concept of edition and re-edition is 
important for our study, since it partially solves the problem of weighing books by importance. 
Books that were considered particularly important for the development of social life (such as 
religious texts), for the functioning or improvement of institutions, or the transfer of essential 
scientific knowledge were re-edited, sometimes again and again. Hence, we measure not only 
the quantity of books, but also their implicit importance as indicated by their re-editions.  
Real wages are taken from the internet data archive set up and documented by Allen (2001), 
and hence follow the patterns already described by him (Allen 2003). 
 
3. Descriptive statistics 
We first discuss the general tendencies observable from the raw data. For the 15
th century, 
Belgium and Italy have the highest levels of book production per capita, overtaken at around 
1600 by the Netherlands and Great Britain (gb for short) (Figure 1). This is an important result 
in itself, because literacy values in England during the Industrial Revolution were previously 
estimated as relatively modest and stagnant (Mitch 1993). However, such a pessimistic view of 
human capital formation during the 1750-1850 period tends to overlook the strong increase 
which occurred in the centuries before 1750, when Great Britain became one of the most 
literate countries of Europe. Thus, the higher number of books per capita could have created 
substantially greater growth capabilities. Germany, the country where Gutenberg invented the 
moveable type, belonged to the middle group as it had clearly less books per capita than Great 
Britain or the Netherlands. Belgium displayed an interesting development, starting out from a 
high level but falling off heavily in relative terms in the 18th century. This is consistent with 
Vandenbroeke’s argument (1985) that the level of literacy may have declined in Belgium in the   6
late 18th and the first half of the 19th century. Spain started at similarly low values as Great 
Britain in the 16th century, and arrived at the lowest overall value in 1750-99. The biggest 
growth success was Sweden, rising from the lowest value in 1450-1599 to a position on par 
with Great Britain in the late 18
th century. The Swedish and Dutch gained enormously during 
that period, relative to the Germans, for example, who destroyed their economy in religious 
wars.  
Spain displays consistently low numbers for the entire period. The fact that real wages 
declined no more than in other European countries might have been due to the availability of 
land in Spain. Following Allen (2003), when explaining changes in real wages, we use the 
agricultural land per agricultural population ratio, the idea being that the non-agricultural 
population could import foodstuffs using their industrial or service sector income, therefore not 
pressing on land resources in a Malthusian way.
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[Figure 1 around here] 
In most countries, real wages declined during this period of rapid population growth (Allen 
2003). This stands in a certain contrast to Maddison’s estimates of GDP growth, which 
suggests that inequality was growing enormously (Hoffmann et al. 2002). Only a small 
portion of the GDP-real wage divergence can be explained by the fact that population moved 
from the low real wage to high wage regions (such as from rural England to London). Another 
part of the divergence, some have argued, is caused by the fact that GDP measures the 
productivity in the modern and urban industrial and commercial sectors, rather than welfare of 
the whole population (among others, see Koepke and Baten 2005).  
Only Great Britain and the Netherlands were able to recover to their late medieval 
level in the early 18th century, although they lost some ground again thereafter. The heaviest 
declines occurred in Spain and Italy. France and Germany formed a middle group with 
relatively modest secular trends, although Germany experienced a strong decline during the   7
Thirty Years’ War but recovered again later. The Netherlands suffered during the struggle for 
independence from Spanish rule, but recovered already in the early 17th century. The net 
effect of these changes was a process of unconditional divergence, with the coefficient of 
variation almost doubling between the 15
th and the 18
th centuries. 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables used in the following 
section. All of them are in logs, except for the dummy variables and intercontinental trade, 
which follows the original specification chosen in Allen (2003), partly because most values 
are zeros which would disappear in logarithmic form. 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
4. Regression analyses 
We first run two fixed effects regressions, including dummies for all centuries under study 
(with the 17th century serving as the reference category), of the econometric form: 
 
[(Ln(rwit) - Ln(rwit-1)]  = 








βnDnit-1 + µi + uit 
 
where [(Ln(rwit ) - Ln(rwit-1)] is the increase of real wages in country i between the 
initial half of the century t-1 and the current half of the century t; Ln boit-1 equals Log book 
production (the human capital proxy) in the initial half of the century, with Ln rw it-1 
indicating the level of real wages in the initial half of the century in log form, and tr and cap 
serving as our ‘alternative/complementary hypothesis’ variables for intercontinental trade and 
capital-protecting institutional constraints on the executive. X is a vector of p control 
variables such as land per capita, the Thirty Years’ War, and similar variables. D is a set of q   8
century dummies which control for technological change in book production, the time variant 
impact of the growth impact per book between centuries, relative price changes, and similar 
factors. Finally, µi are country fixed effects to control for unobservable country 
characteristics, and uit is a stochastic error term. The use of fixed effects models (FE) in 
dynamic panels has been criticized (Durlauf et al. 2005). But in our case, the three main 
points of criticism actually support our approach to use the very long run of growth history: 
The first problem of  FE in such panels is that they put much emphasis on the development 
over time, as opposed to differences between countries. This might be misleading for short 
time intervals (as the typical 1965-2000 growth studies have). This is clearly an argument for 
using half-centuries and a long run time frame, in which it actually makes sense to estimate 
FE. In the same vein, variations over time 1960-2000 might be mainly measurement error, 
Durlauf mentions the examples inequality and schooling. In our case, we can be reasonably 
sure that the changes over time reflect true developments. Thirdly, growth theory suggests 
long-run effects of factors such as human capital, whereas many empirical post-1960 studies 
focus on the short run. A 10% increase in schooling or inequality from 1975 to 1980 cannot 
have too much effect on growth rates 1980-85. Lags (schooling: often 25 years+) are also not 
considered enough. Again, this is a good argument for considering the very long run. 
Since the dependent variable is the real wage growth between the first and the second 
half of the century, it is unlikely that unit root problems arise (panel unit root tests with such 
small samples have very limited power). As all explanatory variables refer to the initial half of 
the century, we avoid contemporaneous correlation problems. Please note that we follow the 
standard procedure developed by Barro (1991, 1999, 2003) and many others, who regress 
growth rates on a set of “growth capabilities” measured in levels. The level of human capital 
is precisely such a “growth capability”, since theory suggests that after controlling for the 
initial welfare level (which might also proxy a country’s capital stock, as Barro (1991) has 
argued), only countries with high human capital can achieve successive welfare growth.    9
Having discussed the international trade of books in the working paper version, we 
decided to test both the per capita production and consumption of books as indicators of 
human capital (Table 2). This dual approach allows us to assess the robustness to changes in 
concept. We find that the influence on real wage growth was statistically significant and 
substantial, even after controlling for a number of other factors. For example, the effect of an 
additional standard deviation of book production per capita is 1.3*0.32=0.42. This is quite a 
large value, given that the standard deviation of real wage growth is only 0.76. Hence, human 
capital as measured in books per capita had indeed a strong, positive, and economically 
significant impact on welfare growth.  
Our proxy variable for intercontinental trade which encompasses Atlantic imports and 
exports per population is insignificant once we control for human capital, conditional 
convergence effects, and other variables. Moreover, this result is quite robust across various 
models (see also the regressions below). 
The constraints on the executive powers to expropriate capital as defined in Acemoglu 
et al. (2002) turns out as an important determinant of growth. However, the positive influence 
of this variable does not change the other results significantly (in spite of some collinearity 
with our book production indicator, as indicated by the correlation coefficient of 0.56). Hence, 
human capital as proxied by book production might have been an additional factor in the 
facilitation of welfare growth, independent of the institutional factors (which were also 
important). We can therefore confirm our introductory hypotheses 1 (human capital) and 3 
(institutions protecting capital), whereas we find no confirmation for hypothesis 2 
(intercontinental trade). 
The level of initial real wages is significantly negative, pointing to the existence of 
conditional convergence in early modern Europe. We would not put too much emphasis on 
this finding, given that fixed effects are somewhat biased towards indicating convergernce   10
effects (Durlauf et al. 2005). But to a certain extent, this might imply that technology transfer 
to initially less sophisticated countries (such as Sweden) took place. 
Our control variables have mostly the expected sign, such as land per agricultural 
worker. Particularly this “Malthusian” variable has a remarkably high coefficient, and is 
statistically significant at the 10% level. Hence, Malthus was right when he argued that land 
was a limiting factor for early modern welfare growth, even if he did not take into account the 
positive counter-forces of human capital accumulation which had reached a critical level 
during the Industrial Revolution and in the end served to break up the premodern, Malthusian 
world, as will be shown in the following section. 
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
Among the control variables, we add a dummy variable for Germany during the Thirty 
Years’ War for obvious reasons, and another for the post-war period (omitting them does not 
change the other results). Hence, we are able to quantify the effect of the Thirty Year’s War 
on Germany while controlling for the other relevant factors. Real wage growth was 
substantially lower in the early 17th century, although this result is only economically, but not 
statistically significant. The recovery effect after the war was even stronger: in the late 17th 
century, i.e. after the peace treaty of 1648, conditional real wage growth increased by more 
than one percent.  
These results are very robust to various specifications (not shown). We also tested the 
random effects model, but rejected it on the basis of the Hausman test. Nevertheless, even in 
the random effects specification, books per capita have a significant impact on real wage 
growth. 
Kremer (2001) has argued that initial population size (or initial land area) might 
impact on technological development in the long run, in particular that technology increases   11
more than proportionally with population size. He argues with his “research equation” that the 
much larger land mass of Eurasia led to its superiority over the Americas, and those over 
Australia, Tasmania and Flinders island, respectively (hence N=5). As a proxy for 
technological development he uses the availability of single technologies, such as “did those 
economies already have stone tools”, “were they engaged in metallurgy” and so on, and 
population growth. We cannot satisfactorily test his argument here, as the European countries 
were much more integrated than Eurasia, the Americas, and Tasmania, which were divided by 
oceans (and his argument refers to the development over millennia). However, we performed 
the experiment to include (a) initial population size and (b) the agricultural land area in our 
regressions, in order not to neglect his influential reasoning. However, those variables turned 
out insignificant, and their inclusion did not change the significance of our human capital 
proxy (results available from authors). 
 
[Table 3 around here] 
 
We also need to address the issue of endogeneity. After all, books are a normal good, 
i.e. consumed more heavily with rising income. One strategy here which was already applied 
above is to take human capital as levels, and subsequent welfare growth in differences, in 
order to avoid contemporaneous correlation (and to measure growth capabilities). Péter 
Földvari (work in progress) found in an annual regression for a similar set of countries that 
book production Granger-causes real wage, and not vice versa. Moreover, we perform 
instrumental variable estimations (Table 3), with two instruments: the lag in book production 
is our first instrument (corresponding to t-2 in the econometric model above, i.e. book 
production almost one century before the wage development to be explained). As a second 
instrument, we include Allen’s (2003) compilation of literacy rates around 1500 and 1800, 
and linear interpolations between those dates. How justified are those instruments? Good   12
instrumental variables should be correlated with the potentially endogenous variable while not 
influencing the ultimate dependent variable, except via the potentially endogenous variable. 
The former is clearly true for both instruments, since both are correlated with initial books per 
capita. For example, in 1750-1799, for which Allen presents relatively reliable literacy data, 
the correlation between those variables is 0.80 (p-value 0.03), for all centuries the correlation 
is 0.73 (p-value 0.00). The latter is also the case here: since we regard our book variable as a 
proxy for advanced literacy (plus some storage of/access to knowledge functions), the effect 
of the interpolated literacy values should go through the same causal channel. The same 
causality chain further applies to Allen’s literacy rates, hence we conclude that both 
instruments are justified. In order to preclude that our instruments are correlated with the error 
term, we performed the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions in a regression with 
country dummies, and found that with a value of 0.11 (p-value 0.74), the Sargan test indicates 
that our instruments are valid.  
 
5. Out-of-sample test: can 18
th century book production explain GDP growth between 
1820 and 1913, as well as the Great Divergence? 
In order to test whether book production can account for economic growth in the 18
th century, 
we perform a partial out-of-sample test of the relation between books per capita and GDP 
growth, using an enlarged data set which includes a number of non-European countries. Apart 
from this out-of-sample test, it is also interesting to assess whether the production of 
knowledge as proxied by book production can explain the ‘Great Divergence,’ i.e. the fact 
that Western Europe and North America grew rapidly in the 19
th century whereas (previously) 
highly developed regions such as China and India lagged behind (Pomeranz 2002). In other 
words, can we predict 19
th century growth using 18
th century book production estimates? In 
order to test this idea, the dataset is extended to include a number of countries for which data 
are available on the second half of the 18
th century – some of them European (Ireland,   13
Switzerland, Poland, Russia), others non-European (United States, China, Indonesia, Japan 
and India).
3
 Figure 2 shows the relationship between book production in the second half of the 18th 
century, and the growth of GDP per capita over the 19
th century (the period of 1820-1913), 
according to Maddison’s (2001) estimates.  
 
[Figure 2 around here] 
 
The relationship is quite strong. Per capita book production in Asia was close to zero 
in the cases of India and Indonesia, and at about 3 per million inhabitants in China. In Japan, 
books per capita, at almost 7 per million inhabitants, were more than twice as high as in 
Russia, but still much lower than in Western Europe. Variation within Europe was also large, 
with the highest levels being attained by the Netherlands (538), Sweden (219), and Great 
Britain (198); not far behind came the U.S. with 141 books per million inhabitants per year. 
However, this large variation within Europe does not affect the overall results much. Only 
China is somewhat of an outlier in Figure 2, but has no greater influence on the relationship 
between the two variables. Both figures show that a close relationship exists between our 
measure of human capital formation for the 18
th century, and economic performance in the 
period of the Industrial Revolution and its aftermath. Countries with a low level of human 
capital formation were unable to participate in the industrialization process which transformed 
the world economy, whereas countries with a better starting position managed to catch up 
with Great Britain – or even to overtake it. It is interesting to note that Japan invested heavily 
in schooling as early as the 18
th century, which is evident from the existence of a mass market 
for books. The high level of schooling in pre-Meiji Japan is also confirmed by other evidence 
(Hayami and Kitô 1999; see also Van Leeuwen 2007 for the large difference between Japan 
on the one hand, and Indonesia and India on the other hand). Apparently, Japan’s high level of   14
education alone was sufficient to make it a successful modernizer, whereas other Asian 




In this study, we employed the number of books per capita in pre-industrial Europe as a proxy 
of advanced literacy. It was exactly in the countries in which book production increased 
fastest that real wages developed systematically better over the centuries before the Industrial 
Revolution than in countries with lagging human capital formation. We performed a number 
of tests to counter-check the validity of those results, such as robustness tests, instrumental 
variable estimations, and controlling for additional variables, but the results remained robust. 
Therefore, we may conclude that human capital formation as measured in this way had a 
strong and positive effect on economic performance in the centuries before 1800.  
We also assessed two alternative hypotheses regarding the role of institutions and 
international (and in particular trans-Atlantic) trade in the growth process. Institutional 
patterns had a positive and independent effect, whereas an effect of intercontinental trade 
could not be established. Hence, we were able to confirm our introductory hypotheses 1 
(human capital) and 3 (institutions protecting capital), whereas we could not confirm 
hypothesis 2 (intercontinental trade). 
Finally, we assessed the movement of human capital formation and economic growth 
beyond 1800, until 1913, considering a larger sample of countries. Again, the number of book 
editions per capita allowed a forecast of countries’ subsequent growth capabilities in the 
century of the Great Divergence. Countries with high levels of human capital formation in the 
18
th century initiated or participated in the industrialization process of the 19
th century, 
whereas countries with low levels of human capital formation were unable to do so, among 
them many of today’s Less Developed Countries such as India, Indonesia, and China.    15
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regressions 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
Real Wage 
Change  54  -0.209  0.759  -1.662  1.734 
Book Consumption  54  3.886  1.253  0.399  6.248 
Book Production  54  3.870  1.300  0.399  6.296 
Initial Real Wage  54  5.142  1.545  2.530  7.979 
Land per Agric. 
Pop.  54  8.154  0.395  7.282  8.991 
Intercont. Trade  54  128.209  446.534  0.000  2726.400 
Post-war  54  0.019  0.136  0.000  1.000 
30-Years-War  54  0.019  0.136  0.000  1.000 
Capital Protection  54  2.296  1.574  1.000  7.000 
Literacy (est.)  54  24.611  13.982  6.000  68.000 
Sources: book production/consumption: see text; capital protection: Acemoglu et al. (2002); other variables: 
Allen (2003). Postwar is 1 for Germany during the half century after the Thirty Years’ War. Book production 
and consumption, as well as intercontinental trade, are per capita.   19
Table 2: Two fixed effects regressions of real wage changes, 1450-1849 
 
Coeff.(1)  p-values(1)  Coeff.(2)  p-values(2) 




Books  0.321  0.018  0.359  0.014 
Initial Real Wage  -0.665  0.000  -0.679  0.000 
Intercont. Trade  0.000  0.721  0.000  0.800 
Capital Protection  0.206  0.053  0.214  0.042 
Land per agric. 
Worker  1.366  0.093  1.441  0.079 
Post-war  1.135  0.095  1.079  0.110 
30-Years-War  -0.948  0.149  -0.998  0.127 
D 16
th  0.009  0.975  0.015  0.959 
D 18
th  -0.135  0.570  -0.172  0.470 
D 19
th  -0.445  0.203  -0.506  0.144 
Constant  -9.529  0.173  -10.226  0.148 




N  54 
 
54  
 Notes: The dependent variable is always the first difference between the log real wage of one half century and 
the next. All explanatory variables refer to the initial half century. Sources: see Table 1.   20
Table 3: Controlling for endogeneity and institutions: three IV fixed effects regressions of 
real wage changes, 1450-1849 
 
Coeff.(1)  p-values(1) Coeff.(2)  p-values(2) Coeff.(3)  p-values(3) 






Books  0.524  0.045  0.512  0.088  0.454  0.071 
Initial Real Wage  -0.899  0.000  -0.901  0.000  -0.927  0.000 
Intercont. Trade  0.000  0.256  0.000  0.184  0.000  0.761 
Capital 
Protection 
       
0.229  0.035 
Land per Agric. 
Worker  0.925  0.458  0.823  0.536  1.012  0.387 
Post-war  0.741  0.301  0.687  0.342  0.678  0.314 
30-Years-War  -1.084  0.104  -1.130  0.095  -1.149  0.067 
D 16
th  0.125  0.721  0.098  0.782  0.095  0.772 
D 18
th  -0.321  0.201  -0.357  0.167  -0.271  0.253 
D 19
th  -0.668  0.088  -0.734  0.062  -0.828  0.028 
Constant  -5.166  0.644  -4.255  0.723  -5.847  0.602 











Notes: see Table 1. The instrumental variables for book production and consumption are (a) lagged book 
production and consumption, and (b) literacy, assuming for 1450-1499 the value of 1500, and interpolating 
linearly to 1800, for which direct estimates are available. We avoid using urbanisation proxies for the centuries 
between 1500 and 1800, as this could be seen as a separate growth determinant, whereas we want to measure the 
human capital effect as purely as possible. For Sweden, a value equal to that of Germany is assumed.   21
Figures 
 
Figure 1: Book production in early modern Europe, 1450/99-1750/99 (number of new 
















Source: see text.   22
Figure 2: Book production per capita between 1750 and 1800, and GDP per capita growth in 
1820-1913 (books on log scale) 
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Endnotes 
                                                
1 There are too many people to thank, so that we cannot do justice to everybody. We 
especially thank Peter Koudijs and Péter Földvari for assistance in the construction of the 
dataset on book production 1454-1800, and Christiaan van Bochove for constructing a real 
wage index for Sweden. We also thank the participants of the CEPR Economic Growth 
Meeting in Venice 2005, the Berlin Colloquium 2006, the Workshop “Biological Welfare and 
Inequality in Pre-industrial Times: A Political Economy Workshop" in New Haven 2005, for 
their comments. Particular thanks for comments to Robert Allen, Greg Clark, Dorothee 
Crayen, Oded Galor, Gerhard Kling, Alexander Moradi, Joachim Voth, and to Frances 
Rosenbluth, who (co-)organized this latter workshop and the related project, and the YCIAS-
Leitner programme for financial support when Baten was a research fellow at Yale University 
and worked on this study. 
2 We added this variable also for Sweden, based on a similar procedure as Allen applied it to 
the other countries: Taking a more recent estimate of agricultural land (van Zanden 1991), and 
dividing that by the agricultural population. The latter we obtained by subtracting the urban 
population share as estimated by Bairoch et.al. (1988) for Scandinavia and the non-
agricultural rural share (for the latter we assumed that it moved similar to the Polish share also 
given by Allen) from the total population. 
In Western-Europe as a whole average per capita book production increased from less than 10 
books per million inhabitants in the 1470s to 130 books in the 1790s. This strong increase was 
closely linked to the falling price of books, which in its turn was caused by economies of 
scale and learning processes (in the printing industry itself and in paper making), leading to an 
almost continuous growth in productivity in this industry. Book prices fell by almost 90% 
between 1460 and 1800. The correlation between falling book prices in the Netherlands (the   24
                                                                                                                                                   
international free market for books during much of the early modern period) and book 
production and consumption was demonstrated in van Zanden (2004). 
3 Sources: for the European countries and the US the same as for the other European 
countries: USA and Ireland the English Short Title Catalogue, Switzerland, Poland and 
Russia: the German book fairs in combination with the Hand-pressed book file (for Russia 
also Marker 1982); Indonesia: Isa 1972; Japan: Hayami and Kitô 1999: 241; China: Tsien 
Tsuen-Hsiun 1985: 190; India: Darnton 2002; see also the discussion of global patterns of 
book production in Van Zanden 2004. Because the 1820 estimates of GDP levels for the 
following test are relatively weak and subject to much debate – with the revisionists claiming 
that the gap between Europe and China was much smaller than estimated by Maddison 
(Pomeranz 2002) – we also compare absolute levels of GDP per capita in 1913, and the same 
book production data for the period of 1750-1800, and found our results confirmed. 
 